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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 05/03/2011 Accident number: 620 
Accident time: 08:45 Accident Date: 05/11/2009 
Where it occurred: AF/2008/00324/H4533
-F, Kandak-e-921 
Sarhadi area, Kohsan 
district, Herat province
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: Not recorded 
ID original source: OPS/14/01- 31, Ref: 
397 -12-2009 
Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded) Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 05/03/2011 
No of victims: 2 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate investigation (?) 
disciplinary action against victim (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 




The only report of this accident that has been made available to date was in a UNMACA 
accident summary. The conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost.  Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised as more 
information becomes available. 
The summary is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
 
United Nations Mine Action Centre For Afghanistan, UNMACA 
File: OPS/14/01- 31. Ref: 397 -12-2009 
Date: 28th December 2009 
Subject: Investigation Report & Lessons Learned of [Demining group] DT# 11 Demining 
Accident 
Attached please find the investigation report and Lessons Learned of Demining Accident, 
which occurred on 05 Nov 2009, at Chah Rig District of kushan Hirat Province 
 
LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DT- 11 DEMINING ACCIDENT 
INTRODUCTION: 
An investigation team was convened by AMAC West to investigate the demining accident 
involving [Victim No.1]  and [Victim No.2] the Deminer and Section Leader from [Demining 
group] DT-11. The accident occurred at 08:45 hours on 05 Nov 2009 at minefield number 
AF/2008/00324/H4533-F, located in Kandak-e-921 Sarhadi area, Kohsan district of Herat 
province. 
SUMMARY: 
AF/2008100324/H4533-F is anti-personnel mine contaminated area, the mines laid by 
government forces during the Russian invasion in Afghanistan The mines were laid in 2 rows 
as a belt around Kandak-e-921 Sarhadi Border division # 921 in order to secure their 
positions from the attacks of Mujahedeen During last 15 years, 16 accidents have happened 
in the area (3 on human, 13 on animals). [Demining group] DT-11 was tasked to clear 
mentioned area. 
On 5th Nov 2009 at 08:45 am deminer [Victim No.1] was working in his clearance lane: he 
was removing excavated soil from the target spot that suddenly his excavation tool touched a 
mine and caused it to go off. As a result of the accident, the deminer got severe injuries to his 
face, eyes and left hand (lost his one eye). 
Section leader [Victim No.2] who was standing close to him also received severe injuries to 
his face, eye and right arm. 
This accident clearly indicates that lack of proper command and control was dominated within 
the team, showing that the command elements of the team were extremely careless about 
safety precautions. There was no any attention paid to safety distance and having visor worn 
properly. 
CONCLUSlONS: 
This accident happened because of lack of command and control in the team and poor 
performance of deminer. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS: 
However disciplinary action was taken by [Demining group] immediately after accident 
happened, the team leader, section leader and victim deminer were terminated from their 
jobs. But the following points are to be considered by all concerned: 
1. Full PPE and visors should be worn correctly all over the working period demining 
operations in the field. 
2. The poor performance of command group should be taken to account and appropriate 
actions to be taken by all concerned, as it is a program wide issue now. 
3. [Demining group] operations department is to present their management solution to prevent 
such accidents in future and provide MACCA OPS department with written documents in 7 
days after this lessons learned being circulated. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 802 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Eyes, severe Face, severe Hand 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Eye  
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 803 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frontal apron 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: severe Arm, severe Eye, severe Face 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. 
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 Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because both 
Victims were not wearing visors when the accident occurred, although one of them was a field 
supervisor. The secondary cause is listed as a Management Control Inadequacy because the 
investigators and the Demining Group managers recognised that the field supervisors did not 
do their jobs correctly. The selection and training of appropriate field supervisor is a 
management responsibility, so the appointment of bad field supervisors is a management 
failing.  
The severity of the injuries to Victim No.2 imply that he was alongside Victim No.1 and 
perhaps looking over his shoulder (so having his head within the fragmentation cone 
associated with an AP blast). Both Victims having hand/arm injuries imply that they both have 
been working to expose the mine at the same time. Supervisors are permitted (in the IMAS) 
to approach close to the deminer to watch them work but all work must cease when they 
come within a few metres. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years 
in contravention of the requirements of the IMAS. The existence of a good summary implies 
that the Afghan investigators carried out a professional investigation and generated a detailed 
report that should be shared. 
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